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One Action or One Exception 
Bank of America v Graves 
 
ROGER BERNHARDT 
In these columns I generally try to reflect about how attorneys may have to revise their 
behavior because of some new legal development. This time, however, I cannot say that the 
decision in Bank of America v Graves (1996) 51 CA4th 607, 59 CR2d 288, reported at 20 CEB 
RPLR 79 (Mar. 1997), means that we have to do anythi g differently, only that the settled old 
way of behaving may not be as secure as it formerly was. 
When a distressed borrower defaults on its real-property-secured loans, it usually fails to pay 
on all of its mortgages, whether senior or junior. If your client was the junior mortgagee on a 
loan in default, the old way of doing things was to advise her that she had the choice of 
foreclosing on her second mortgage or, instead, letting he senior mortgagee foreclose on its first 
mortgage, thereby transforming her into a sold-out junior. The term “sold-out junior” refers to 
the situation in which the senior lienholder forecloses and extinguishes the junior’s security 
interest; consequently, the junior’s security interest has become “worthless” through no fault of 
its own and the junior is permitted to sue the borrower directly on the note despite the one-action 
rule (CCP §726). See California Mortgage and Deed of Trust Practice §4.8 (2d ed Cal CEB 
1990). 
Contrary to lay intuitive beliefs, it is often bettr for the junior to let herself be sold out than to 
take any affirmative collection steps on her own. If the security’s value is dubious, it is unlikely 
the junior will fully recover if she acquires the pro erty at her own junior foreclosure. If the 
junior forecloses by trustee sale rather than judicial sale, CCP §580d bars a postforeclosure 
deficiency judgment. Even in a judicial sale, which can entitle the lender to both foreclosure of 
its interest and (with certain exceptions) a deficin y judgment against the borrower, the 
whipsaw combination of fair value limitations (CCP §726(b)) and the borrower’s postsale 
redemption rights (CCP §§726(e), 729.010–729.090) makes this option much less attractive. 
The Value of Being Sold Out 
Alternatively, if the junior lets the senior foreclose first, neither the fact that the senior sale 
was nonjudicial nor the possibility that the property had enough value to pay both loans has any 
effect on her right to sue the debtor for the entir unpaid balance of her note. She will lose her 
security, but a money judgment unencumbered by deficiency judgment limitations against a 
solvent debtor may be a good trade. (The CCP §580b restrictions on deficiency judgments on 
purchase money notes alter all these outcomes, so purchase money juniors are not considered in 
this column.) 
It’s easy enough to let the senior go first when the debtor has defaulted on both obligations: 
the junior just does nothing. Inevitably the senior will act, and when that action entails a 
foreclosure, the junior is then free to sue on her note and go after the debtor’s other assets 
instead. 
Any device that works so well for creditors, however, is bound to be unpopular to debtors; 
they would much rather see the junior foreclose than see her elevated into a §726-free status. 
Debtors have twice lost the argument that the one-action rule should force juniors to join in 
senior foreclosures so as to consolidate two proceedings into one. See Roseleaf Corp. v 
Chierighino (1963) 59 C2d 35, 27 CR 873, and Savings Bank v Central Market (1898) 122 C 28, 
54 P 273. Their basic argument came up again in a slightly different guise, however, and the 
margin of defeat was narrow enough to make this observer wonder how solid the creditors’ 
position is. 
The sold-out junior exception requires that the lienholder be “without fault” regarding the loss 
of security, lest secured creditors otherwise merely t ar up their security documents in order to 
sue on their notes. Mortgage and Deed of Trust §4.8. That inevitably led debtors to contend that 
the lender was at fault in their particular case. The contention almost worked in Bank of America 
v Graves. 
Bank of America v Graves 
In Graves, the junior—a bank holding a defaulted equity line account—started its own trustee 
sale proceeding, but then postponed it so the senior could go to sale before it. That kind of active 
inertia, claimed the borrowers, meant that the junior had brought its sold-out status on itself and 
should bar it from then suing on its note. 
From the appellate court’s description of their positi n, the borrowers were not really that 
persuasive. Their contention that “once the Bank commenced its foreclosure action, it was 
obliged to complete it” (51 CA4th at 615) was easy for the court to reject through a parade of 
horribles (51 CA4th at 615): 
If the junior lienholder must complete the proceedings, why would the junior lienholder not also 
be required to commence the proceedings immediately upon default of its debtor? Otherwise, the 
lienholder could be accused of sleeping upon its rights and “losing” its lien by allowing the 
senior lienholder to commence its foreclosure. . . . 
The Banks’ only recourse would be to start and, withou  interruption, complete foreclosure, 
lest their hesitancy caused them to lose their secured position. If they delayed the process to 
work things out with the debtor, they could be found to have slept on their rights and therefore to 
have lost their security. 
And, worse yet, in all cases, the holder of the second lien would be obliged to pay or assume 
the first lien position. 
The majority’s logic made it easy for the dissenting judge to argue that a contrary rule would 
not force the junior to go first, but would merely bar it from starting and then stopping its own 
sale so the senior could go first, which it referred to as “taking affirmative action with the intent 
to circumvent the one-action rule.” 51 CA4th at 618. 
I have omitted the extensive policy discussions offered by both the majority and the dissent. 
The majority was concerned about the effects that a contrary rule would have on lending 
practices and loan availability, and the dissent worried about lenders manipulating the one-action 
rule. Sold-out junior issues are not as set in concrete as we thought, apparently. 
The Underlying Issues 
If courts are really prepared to undertake a true critical analysis of the issues behind the 
question raised in Graves, they will have to ask: 
• Why do we read CCP §726 to prohibit actions on notes when other states do not and our own 
Commercial Code (Com C §9504) does the opposite for chattel security? Does such a reading 
offer any real protection to debtors (except by way of tripping up creditors)? 
• Assuming there is some reason to read §726 as a foreclosure-first rule, why do we create an 
exception to it for juniors who are sold out, but not for other juniors with equally worthless 
security? Where is that distinction to be found in the statute, and who benefits from it? 
• Assuming there is some reason to treat sold-out juniors specially, why is the exception limited to 
cases where there is no fault? What is such a tort concept doing in a financial rule; do we care 
about why a debtor defaults? 
• Assuming there is some reason to protect sold-out juniors only when they are without fault, why 
does that protect the junior who elects to let the senior go first (whether by starting and then 
stopping its own foreclosure or by never starting i the first place)? Doesn’t the bedrock 
antimultiplicity policy of §726 make that the worst kind of fault possible? 
Long ago the California Supreme Court held that a junior was not at fault in declining to join 
in the senior’s judicial foreclosure, but did not really explain why. Savings Bank v Central 
Market Co. (1898) 122 C 28, 33, 54 P 273. Mandatory joinder would have certainly furthered the 
antimultiplicity policy that our courts divine as an underpinning to §726 (the commonly stated 
purpose of §726 being to eliminate the possibility that numerous actions will be brought against 
the defaulting debtor), and the burden on the junior (i.e., having to join in the senior’s proceeding 
rather than being able to initiate its own) certainly seems outweighed by the burden on the debtor 
(i.e., being subject to two proceedings in a jurisdiction that has a policy against multiplicity). A 
different result in Central Market would merely have led to some kind of consolidated 
foreclosure sale held on behalf of both lienholders, with all the deficiency rules thereafter 
applicable to the junior as well as the senior. 
Incompatible Values 
I predict that some day our courts will realize that the sold-out junior exception they have 
created to §726 is inconsistent with the antimultiplicity policy they find in §726. Graves came 
close to facing up to it; the next time, we may all be surprised. 
 
